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Abstract A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by
cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply
a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to
every TU-game. A well-known solution is the Shapley value. In the literature various
models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, instead of allowing all
subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions
is a subset of the power set of N . In this paper, we consider such sets of feasible
coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their
union is feasible. We consider and axiomatize two solutions or rules for these games
that generalize the Shapley value: one is obtained as the conjunctive permission value
using a corresponding superior graph, the other is defined as the Shapley value of a
modified game similar as the Myerson value for games with limited communication.
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1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a finite set of
players and for any subset (coalition) of players a worth representing the total payoff
that the coalition can obtain by cooperating. A (single-valued) solution is a function
that assigns to every game a payoff vector which components are the individual pay-
offs of the players. One of the most applied solutions for cooperative TU-games is the
Shapley value (Shapley (1953)), which is applied to economic allocation problems
in, e.g. Graham et al. (1990), Maniquet (2003), Chun (2006), Tauman and Watanabe
(2007), van den Brink et al. (2007), Bergantiños and Lorenzo-Freire (2008), and Ligett
et al. (2009).
In its classical interpretation, a TU-game describes a situation in which the play-
ers in every coalition S of N can cooperate to form a feasible coalition and earn
its worth. In the literature various restrictions on coalition formation are developed.1
For example, in Myerson (1977) a coalition is feasible if it is connected in a given
(communication) graph. In this paper, we consider games in which the collection of
feasible coalitions is closed under union, meaning that for any pair of feasible coali-
tions also their union is feasible. A well-known example of a union closed system is an
antimatroid.2 An example of an antimatroid is an acyclic permission structure where
players need permission from (some of) their superiors in a hierarchical structure
when they want cooperate with others. Since the concept of union closed system is
more general than the notion of antimatroid, games on union closed systems are more
general than the games on antimatroids as considered in Algaba et al. (2003, 2004),
and, therefore, also more general than the games with acyclic permission structure,
considered in Gilles et al. (1992), van den Brink and Gilles (1996), Gilles and Owen
(1994) and van den Brink (1997).
In this paper, we define and axiomatize two solutions for games on union closed
systems. The first solution is based on games with a permission structure, the other
directly applies the Shapley value to some restricted game. Both solutions general-
ize the Shapley value in the sense that they are equal to the Shapley value when the
union closed system is the power set of player set N . First, we apply a method similar
as Myerson (1977) to define a solution for games on union closed systems which
generalizes the Shapley value for games on antimatroids as axiomatized in Algaba et
al. (2003). To do so, a modified or restricted game is defined. This game is obtained
by assigning to any non-feasible coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset.
1 For a survey we refer to Bilbao (2000).
2 A collection of feasible coalitions A ⊆ 2N is an antimatroid if, besides being union closed and containing
∅, it satisfies accessibility meaning that S ∈ A implies that there is a player i ∈ S such that S\{i} ∈ A, see
Dilworth (1940).
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By union closedness, this largest feasible subset is unique. Then the union rule for
games on union closed systems is defined as the Shapley value of this restricted game.
To define the second solution, we define for a union closed system its corresponding
superior graph. This is the directed graph that is obtained by putting an arc from player
i to player j if every feasible coalition containing player j also contains player i . We
then consider the game with permission structure induced by this superior graph, and
define the superior rule as its conjunctive permission value.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section on coopera-
tive TU-games and games with a permission structure. Section 3 introduces the two
solutions for games on union closed systems and in Sect. 4 we provide axioms that
can be satisfied by solutions for games on union closed systems. In Sect. 5, we give an
axiomatization of the superior rule for games on union closed systems, and in Sect. 6
we axiomatize the union rule. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperating can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game,
being a pair (N , v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n players and v : 2N → R
is a characteristic function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition E ⊆ N , v(E)
is the worth of coalition E , i.e., the members of coalition E can obtain a total payoff of
v(E) by agreeing to cooperate. Since we take the player set N to be fixed, we denote
the game (N , v) just by its characteristic function v. We denote the collection of all
characteristic functions on N by GN and n = |N | denotes the cardinality of N . A
game v ∈ GN is monotone if v(E) ≤ v(F) for all E ⊆ F ⊆ N . We denote by GNM the
class of all monotone TU-games on N .
A payoff vector for a game is a vector x ∈ Rn assigning a payoff xi to every i ∈ N .
In the sequel, for E ⊆ N we denote x(E) = ∑i∈E xi . A (single-valued) solution f
is a function that assigns to any v ∈ GN a unique payoff vector. The most well-known
(single-valued) solution is the Shapley value given by
Shi (v) =
∑
{E⊆N |i∈E}
(|N | − |E |)!(|E | − 1)!
|N |! (v(E) − v(E\{i})) for all i ∈ N .
For each non-empty T ⊆ N , the unanimity game uT is given by uT (E) = 1
if T ⊆ E , and uT (E) = 0 otherwise. It is well known that the unanimity games
form a basis for GN . For every v ∈ GN it holds that v = ∑ T⊆N
T =∅
v(T )uT , where
v(T ) = ∑E⊆T (−1)|T |−|E |v(E) are the Harsanyi dividends, see Harsanyi (1959).
2.2 Cooperative games with a permission structure
A game with a permission structure on N describes a situation where some players in
a TU-game need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate
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within a coalition. Formally, a permission structure can be described by a directed
graph on N . A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N , D) where N = {1, . . . , n} is a
finite set of nodes (representing the players) and D ⊆ N × N is a binary relation on N .
In the sequel we simply refer to D for a digraph (N , D) and we denote the collection
of all digraphs on N by DN . For i ∈ N the nodes in SD(i) := { j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ D} are
called the successors of i , and the nodes in PD(i) := { j ∈ N | ( j, i) ∈ D} are called
the predecessors of i . By ŜD(i) we denote the set of successors of i in the transitive clo-
sure of D, i.e., j ∈ ŜD(i) if and only if there exists a sequence of players (h1, . . . , ht )
such that h1 = i, hk+1 ∈ SD(hk) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t−1, and ht = j . Further, for T ⊆ N ,
we denote ŜD(T ) = ∪i∈T ŜD(i). We call digraph D acyclic if i ∈ ŜD(i) for all i ∈ N .
Note that acyclicity of a digraph D implies that D is irreflexive, i.e., (i, i) ∈ D for all
i ∈ N , and that D has at least one node that does not have a predecessor.
A tuple (v, D) with v ∈ GN a TU-game and D ∈ DN a digraph on N is called a
game with a permission structure. In this paper, we follow the conjunctive approach
as introduced in Gilles et al. (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996) in which it is
assumed that a player needs permission from all its predecessors in order to cooperate
with other players.3 Therefore, a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player in
the coalition all its predecessors are also in the coalition. So, for permission structure
D the set of conjunctive feasible coalitions is given by
cD = {E ⊆ N |PD(i) ⊆ E for all i ∈ E } .
For any E ⊆ N , let σ cD(E) =
⋃
{F∈cD |F⊆E} E = E\ŜD(N\E) be the largest
conjunctive feasible subset of E in the collection cD .4 Then, the induced restricted
game of the pair (v, D) under the conjunctive approach is the game rcv,D : 2N → R,
given by
rcv,D(E) = v(σ cD(E)) for all E ⊆ N ,
i.e., the restricted game rcv,D assigns to each coalition E ⊆ N the worth of its largest
conjunctive feasible subset of E . Then the conjunctive permission value ϕc is the
solution that assigns to every game with a permission structure the Shapley value of
the restricted game, thus
ϕc(v, D) = Sh(rcv,D).
3 Solutions for games on union closed systems
We consider tuples (v,), where v is a TU-game on player set N and  ⊆ 2N is a
collection of subsets of N . We call such a tuple a game with limited cooperation. In
3 As an alternative, Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997) consider the disjunctive approach,
where it is assumed that a player needs permission to cooperate of at least one of its predecessors (if it has
any).
4 This largest feasible subset is unique since cD is closed under union, see Definition 1.
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such a game the collection of subsets  restricts the cooperation possibilities of the
players in N . A set S ⊆ N of players can attain its value v(S) if S ∈ . When S ∈ 
then not all players are able to cooperate within S, so that v(S) can not be realised.
We say that a coalition S ∈ 2N is feasible if S ∈ . In this paper, we only consider
sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union.
Definition 1 A collection  ⊆ 2N is a union closed system of coalitions if
1. ∅, N ∈ ,
2. If S, T ∈ , then S ∪ T ∈ .
Notice that  = {∅, N } is the smallest union closed system and that  = 2N is the
largest one. Also notice that every antimatroid is a union closed system by definition.
Also the collection of conjunctive feasible coalitions of a permission structure is union
closed (see Gilles et al. 1992) and this collection is an antimatroid when the permission
structure is acyclic (see Algaba et al. 2004).
We assume that the ‘grand coalition’ N is feasible for notational convenience. The
results in this paper can be modified to hold without this assumption if in the axioms
we distinguish between players that belong to at least one feasible coalition and those
that do not belong to any feasible coalition. Note that by condition 2 in Definition 1
the ‘grand coalition’ is feasible if every player belongs to at least one feasible coa-
lition. So, instead of assuming that N ∈  we could do with the weaker normality
assumption stating that every player belongs to at least one feasible coalition. In the
sequel we denote the collection of all union closed systems in 2N by CN .
A solution for games on union closed systems is a function f that assigns a payoff
distribution f (v,) ∈ Rn to every v ∈ GN and  ∈ CN . In the following, we
introduce two solutions.
For a tuple (v,), let σ : 2N →  be given by
σ(S) =
⋃
{E∈|E⊆S}
E,
i.e., σ(S) is the largest feasible subset of S in the system . By union closedness
this largest feasible subset is unique. Then the restricted game rv, ∈ GN of (v,) is
defined by
rv,(S) = v(σ(S)),
and thus assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N the worth of its largest feasible subset. Notice
that when v is monotone, it holds that for every  ∈ CN also the restricted game rv,
is monotone, since S ⊆ T implies that σ(S) ⊆ σ(T ). Now, the first solution is
the union rule, which is defined similar as the Myerson rule for games with limited
communication in Myerson (1977) and the Shapley value for games on antimatroids
in Algaba et al. (2003). The union rule, denoted by U , is given by
Ui (v,) = Shi (rv,) for all i ∈ N ,
i.e., the union rule assigns to every (v,) the Shapley value of the restriced game rv,.
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The second solution applies the conjunctive permission value to a digraph asso-
ciated with the union closed system, called the superior graph. For a union closed
system  ∈ CN , the associated superior graph is the graph that assigns an arc from a
player i to a player j if and only if every feasible coalition containing player j also
contains player i . So, the arcs can be seen as some kind of dominance relation in the
sense that a player is a subordinate of another player if it ‘needs’ the other player to
be in a feasible coalition. For two players i, j ∈ N , i = j , player i is a superior of
player j in  ∈ CN , if i ∈ S for every S ∈  with j ∈ S. In that case we call player
j a subordinate of player i .
Definition 2 For  ∈ CN , the superior graph of  is the directed graph D ∈ DN
with
D = {(i, j) ∈ N × N | i is superior of j in }.
Notice that i is a subordinate (superior) of j in  ∈ CN if and only if i is a successor
(predecessor) of j in D. The next corollary is straightforward.
Corollary 1 Let  ∈ CN . If i is a superior of j in , and k is a superior of i in ,
then k is a superior of j in .
Having constructed the superior graph D of a union closed system , we consider
now the set of feasible coalitions of the permission structure D according to the
conjunctive approach, and we denote this collection of coalitions by  = cD .
Proposition 1 For  ∈ CN it holds that  ⊆ .
Proof Let S ∈ . By definition of superior it holds that S includes all superiors of i
for every i ∈ S. On the other hand it holds that ( j, i) ∈ D if and only if j is superior
of i, i ∈ S. It follows that S is feasible for the permission structure D according to
the conjunctive approach. Hence  ⊆ . 	unionsq
The superior rule, denoted by SUP , is the solution for games on union closed
systems given by
SUPi (v,) = ϕci (v, D) = Shi (rcv,D) for all i ∈ N ,
i.e., the superior rule assigns to every (v,) the conjunctive permission value of the
game v with the induced permission structure D. The following example shows that
the union and superior rule are different.
Example 1 Consider the tuple (v,) on N = {1, 2, 3, 4} with game v = u{3} and
union closed system  = {∅, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. The
restricted game rv, is given by rv, = u{1,3} + u{3,4} − u{1,3,4}, and thus the union
rule gives payoff vector U (v,) = Shi (rv,) = ( 16 , 0, 23 , 16 ).
On the other hand, the superior graph is given by D = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}, and the
corresponding restricted game under the permission structure is given by rc
v,D =
u{3} = v. It follows that SUP(v,) = Shi (rcv,D) = (0, 0, 1, 0).
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4 Axioms
In this section, we state several axioms that can be satisfied by solutions for games
on union closed systems. The first five axioms are generalizations of axioms used
to axiomatize the conjunctive permission value in van den Brink and Gilles (1996)
and the Shapley value for games on poset antimatroids in Algaba et al. (2003). First,
efficiency states that the total sum of payoffs equals the worth of the ‘grand’ coalition.
Axiom 1 (Efficiency) For every game v ∈ GN and union closed system  ∈ CN , we
have
∑
i∈N fi (v,) = v(N ).
Additivity is a straightforward generalization of the well-known additivity axiom
for TU-games.
Axiom 2 (Additivity) For every pair of cooperative TU-games v,w ∈ GN and union
closed system  ∈ CN , we have f (v + w,) = f (v,) + f (w,).
Next, we introduce a generalization of the inessential player property stating that
a null player in v whose subordinates in  are all null players in v, earns a zero
payoff. We say that player i ∈ N is inessential in (v,) if v(E ∪ { j}) = v(E) for all
j ∈ {i} ∪ SD(i) and E ⊆ N\{ j}. For v ∈ GN and  ∈ CN , we denote by I (v,)
the set of all inessential players in (v,).
Axiom 3 (Inessential player property) For every game v ∈ GN and union closed
system  ∈ CN , we have that fi (v,) = 0 for all i ∈ I (v,).
The next axiom generalizes the necessary player property (which holds for mono-
tone TU-games) in a straightforward way, stating that a necessary player in a monotone
game earns at least as much as any other player, irrespective of the coalitions in the
union closed system. A player i ∈ N is necessary in game v if v(E) = 0 for all
E ⊆ N\{i}.
Axiom 4 (Necessary player property) For every monotone game v ∈ GNM and union
closed system  ∈ CN , we have fi (v,) ≥ f j (v,) for all j ∈ N , when i ∈ N is a
necessary player in v.
Finally, structural monotonicity is generalized using the superior graph, stating that
whenever player i is a superior of player j in the union closed system and the game
is monotone, then player i earns at least as much as player j .
Axiom 5 (Structural monotonicity) For every monotone game v ∈ GNM and union
closed system  ∈ CN , we have fi (v,) ≥ f j (v,) if i ∈ N and j ∈ SD(i).
In the next section, we show that the superior rule is characterized by these five
axioms. The union rule satisfies these axioms except the inessential player property.5
5 Consider, for instance, Example 1. Since D = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}, the set of inessential players is given
by I (v,) = {1, 2, 4}. However, U (v,) = ( 16 , 0, 23 , 16 ) and thus the inessential player property is not
satisfied.
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However, the union rule satisfies the weaker axiom requiring zero payoffs for ines-
sential players only in games where the worth of any coalition equals the worth of its
largest feasible subset.6
Axiom 6 (Inessential player property for union closed games) For every game v ∈ GN
and union closed system  ∈ CN such that v(E) = v(σ(E)) for all E ⊆ N , it holds
that fi (v,) = 0 for every i ∈ I (v,).
Of course, also the superior rule satisfies this weaker axiom. Finally, we introduce
another axiom that is satisfied by the union rule but not by the superior rule. It states
that the payoffs only depend on the worths of feasible coalitions.
Axiom 7 (Independence of irrelevant coalitions) For every pair of cooperative TU-
games v,w ∈ GN and union closed system  ∈ CN , we have f (v,) = f (w,)
whenever v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ .
To show that this axiom is not satisfied by the superior rule, consider again Example 1
and let game w be given by w = rv,. Obviously w(E) = v(E) for all E ∈ . Since
the superior graph is given by D = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}, we have that rc
v,D = u{3} = v
and rc
w,D = u{1,3} + u{3,4} − u{1,3,4} = w. Then SUP(v,) = (0, 0, 1, 0) and
SUP(w,) = ( 16 , 0, 23 , 16 ), so the axiom is not satisfied. In Sect. 6 we show that the
union rule is characterized by the latter two axioms together with the first four axioms.
5 Axiomatization of the superior rule
The following theorem characterizes the superior rule for games on union closed
systems.
Theorem 1 A solution f for cooperative games on union closed systems is equal to
the superior rule SUP if and only if it satisfies efficiency, additivity, the inessential
player property, the necessary player property and structural monotonicity.
Proof First, the superior rule satisfies the five axioms. By efficiency of the conjunc-
tive permission value (i.e., ∑i∈N ϕci (v, D) = v(N ) for every v ∈ GN and D ∈ DN )
we have that
∑
i∈N SUPi (v,) =
∑
i∈N ϕci (v, D) = v(N ), showing that the supe-
rior rule satisfies efficiency. Additivity, the inessential player property, the necessary
player property and structural monotonicity follow from the corresponding axioms of
the conjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure, see van den
Brink and Gilles (1996, Theorem 3.6).
The proof of uniqueness follows similar steps as the uniqueness proof for the con-
junctive permission value in van den Brink and Gilles (1996, Theorem 3.6). Suppose
that solution f satisfies the five axioms. Let v0 be the null game given by v0(E) = 0
for all E ⊆ N . The inessential player property then implies that fi (v0,) = 0 for all
i ∈ N .
6 Note that the union rule satisfies the stronger property requiring zero payoffs for all null players in games
v such that v(E) = v(σ(E)) for all E ⊆ N .
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Now, consider a union closed system  and game wT = cT uT , for some cT > 0
and ∅ = T ⊆ N . Note that wT ∈ GNM . We distinguish the following three cases with
respect to i ∈ N :
1. If i ∈ T then the necessary player property implies that there exists a c∗ ∈ R such
that fi (wT ,) = c∗ for all i ∈ T , and fi (wT ,) ≤ c∗ for all i ∈ N\T .
2. If i ∈ N\T and T ∩ ({i} ∪ SD(i)) = ∅ then structural monotonicity implies that
fi (wT ,) ≥ f j (wT ,) for every j ∈ T ∩ ({i} ∪ SD(i)), and thus with case 1
that fi (wT ,) = c∗.
3. If i ∈ N\T and T ∩ ({i} ∪ SD(i)) = ∅ then the inessential player property
implies that fi (wT ,) = 0.
From 1 and 2 follows that fi (wT ,) = c∗ for i ∈ T ∪ PD(T ). Efficiency and
3 then imply that
∑
i∈N fi (wT ,) = |T ∪ PD(T )|c∗ = cT , implying that c∗, and
thus f (wT ,), is uniquely determined.
Next, consider (wT ,) with wT = cT uT for some cT < 0 (and thus we can-
not apply the necessary player property and structural monotonicity since wT is not
monotone). Since −wT = −cT uT with −cT > 0, and v0 = wT + (−wT ), it follows
from additivity of f that f (wT ,) = f (v0,) − f (−wT ,) = − f (−wT ,) is
uniquely determined because −wT is monotone.
Finally, since every characteristic function v ∈ GN can be written as a linear combi-
nation of unanimity games v = ∑T⊆N v(T )uT (with v(T ) the Harsanyi dividend
of coalition T ), additivity uniquely determines f (v,) = ∑T⊆N f (v(T )uT ,)
for any v ∈ GN and  ∈ CN . 	unionsq
We conclude this section by showing that the five axioms stated in Theorem 1 are
logically independent.
1. The solution that assigns to every game on union closed system simply the Shap-
ley value of game v, i.e., f (v,) = Sh(v), satisfies efficiency, additivity, the
inessential player property and the necessary player property. It does not satisfy
structural monotonicity.
2. For v ∈ GN and  ∈ CN , let v ∈ GN be given by v(E) = v(⋃i∈E {i} ∪ SD(i))
for all E ⊆ N . The solution f (v,) = Sh(v) satisfies efficiency, additivity,
the inessential player property and structural monotonicity. It does not satisfy the
necessary player property.
3. The equal division solution given by fi (v,) = v(N )|N | for all i ∈ N , satisfies
efficiency, additivity, the necessary player property and structural monotonicity.
It does not satisfy the inessential player property.
4. The equal division over essential players, given by
fi (v,) =
{
v(N )
|N\I (v,)| if i ∈ N\I (v,)
0 if i ∈ I (v,),
satisfies efficiency, the inessential player property, the necessary player property
and structural monotonicity. It does not satisfy additivity.
123
184 R. van den Brink et al.
5. The zero solution given by fi (v,) = 0 for all i ∈ N satisfies additivity, the ines-
sential player property, the necessary player property and structural monotonicity.
It does not satisfy efficiency.
6 Axiomatization of the union rule
As mentioned in Sect. 4, all axioms that are used to characterize the superior rule in
Theorem 1 are also satisfied by the union rule, except the inessential player property.
Instead, it satisfies the weaker inessential player property for union closed games and
independence of irrelevant coalitions. Replacing in Theorem 1, the inessential player
property by the weaker inessential player property for union closed games, and add-
ing independence of irrelevant coalitions, characterizes the union rule. In that case
we can do without structural monotonicity. To prove this characterization, we use the
following lemma. For  ∈ CN and T ⊆ N , we define T = {H ∈  | T ⊆ H} as
the set of feasible coalitions containing coalition T .
Lemma 1 For every  ∈ CN , T ⊆ N and c ∈ R, there exist numbers δH ∈ R, H ∈
T , such that rcuT , =
∑
H∈T δH u H .
Proof Consider  ∈ CN , T ⊆ N and c ∈ R. If T ∈  then T ∈ T , and we have
δT = c and δH = 0 for all H ∈ T \{T }. If T ∈ , then define
T 1 = {H ∈  | T ⊂ H and there is no Z ∈  such that T ⊂ Z ⊂ H}
and, recursively, for k ≥ 2
T k =
{
H ∈  | T ⊂ H and Z ∈ ∪k−1p=1 T p for all Z ∈  with T ⊂ Z ⊂ H
}
.
Since N is finite there exists an M < ∞ such that T k = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . M},
T M+1 = ∅ and ⋃Mk=1 T k = T . Since by definition T k ∩T l = ∅ for all k, l ∈ IN, we
have that T 1, . . . , T M is a partition of the set {H ∈  | T ⊂ H} of feasible coalitions
containing non-feasible coalition T . (Note that this set equals T since T ∈ .) Then
δH = c for all H ∈ T 1 and, recursively for k = 2, . . . , M , the numbers δH , H ∈ T k ,
are determined by
δH +
∑
{Z⊂H |Z∈⋃k−1l=1 T l }
δZ = c.
	unionsq
Theorem 2 A solution f for cooperative games on union closed systems is equal to
the union rule U if and only if it satisfies efficiency, additivity, the inessential player
property for union closed games, the necessary player property and independence of
irrelevant coalitions.
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Proof We first prove that U satisfies the five axioms. Let v ∈ GN and  ∈ CN .
1. By efficiency of the Shapley value and σ(N ) = N , we have ∑i∈N Ui (v,) =∑
i∈N Shi (rv,) = v(N ), showing that U satisfies efficiency.
2. Additivity of the Shapley value and the fact that rv,(S)+rw,(S) = v(σ(S))+
w(σ(S)) = (v + w)(σ(S)) = rv+w,(S) for all S ⊆ N , imply for i ∈ N that
Ui (v,)+Ui (w,) = Shi (rv,)+ Shi (rw,D) = Shi (rv+w,) = Ui (v+w,),
showing that U satisfies additivity.
3. U satisfying the inessential player property for union closed games follows directly
from the null player property of the Shapley value.
4. Let v be a monotone game on N . Since S ⊆ T implies that σ(S) ⊆ σ(T ), by
monotonicity of v we have that rv, is a monotone game on N . The necessary
player property then follows from the necessary player property of the Shapley
value.
5. If v(S) = w(S) for all S ∈ , then rv, = rw,, showing that the union rule U
satisfies independence of irrelevant coalitions.
To prove that the five axioms characterize a unique solution, let  ∈ CN and
consider v = cuT for some c ∈ R and ∅ = T ⊆ N . We distinguish two cases.
1. Let T ∈ , i.e., T is feasible. Then rcuT , = cuT . From the necessary player
property it follows that there exists a c∗ ∈ R such that fi (cuT ,) = c∗ for all
i ∈ T . Since i ∈ N\T is a null player in cuT , and cuT (E) = cuT (σ(E))
for all E ⊆ N (since T ∈ ), the inessential player property for union closed
games implies that fi (cuT ,) = 0 for all i ∈ N\T . Then efficiency implies that
c∗ = fi (cuT ,) = c|T | for all i ∈ T , and thus f (cuT ,) is determined.
2. Suppose that T ∈ , i.e., T is not feasible. Recall that T = {H ∈  | T ⊆
H} is the collection of feasible subsets of N that contain T . (Note that T ∈
T since T ∈ .) By Lemma 1 there exist numbers δH , H ∈ T , such that
rcuT , =
∑
H∈T δH u H . Since cuT (E) = rcuT ,(E) for all E ∈ , by indepen-
dence of irrelevant coalitions it then follows that f (cuT ,) = f (rcuT ,,) =
f (∑H∈T δH u H ,). By additivity we then have that
f (cuT ,) = f
⎛
⎝
∑
H∈T
δH u H ,
⎞
⎠ =
∑
H∈T
f (δH u H ,).
Since all H ∈ T are feasible in , we know from case 1 that f (δH u H ,) is
uniquely determined for every H ∈ T . Thus, f (cuT ,)=∑H∈T f (δH u H ,)
is uniquely determined.
Finally, it follows that additivity uniquely determines f (v,) = ∑T⊆N
f (v(T )uT ,) for every v ∈ GN . 	unionsq
Also the axioms of Theorem 2 are logically independent as shown by the following
alternative solutions.
123
186 R. van den Brink et al.
1. The superior rule satisfies efficiency, additivity, the inessential player property for
union closed games and the necessary player property. It does not satisfy inde-
pendence of irrelevant coalitions.
2. The solution that assigns to every game on union closed system the weighted
Shapley of the restricted game rv, for some exogenous weight system ω ∈ Rn
with ωi = ω j for some i, j ∈ N , satisfies efficiency, additivity, the inessential
player property for union closed games and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
It does not satisfy the necessary player property.
3. The equal division solution given by fi (v,) = v(N )|N | for all i ∈ N , satisfies
efficiency, additivity, the necessary player property and independence of irrele-
vant coalitions. It does not satisfy the inessential player property for union closed
games.
4. The equal division over non-null players, given by
fi (v,) =
{
v(N )
|N\Null(v,)| if i ∈ N\Null(v,)
0 if i ∈ Null(v,),
where Null(v,) denotes the set of null players in the restricted game rv,, satis-
fies efficiency, the inessential player property for union closed games, the neces-
sary player property and independence of irrelevant coalitions. It does not satisfy
additivity.
5. The zero solution given by fi (v,) = 0 for all i ∈ N satisfies additivity, the
inessential player property for union closed games, the necessary player property
and independence of irrelevant coalitions. It does not satisfy efficiency.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduced two generalizations of the Shapley value to games on
union closed systems. The superior rule applies the conjunctive permission value to
an associated game with permission structure, while the union rule is obtained as
the Shapley value of the restricted game. Both rules satisfy efficiency, additivity, the
inessential player property for union closed games, the necessary player property and
structural monotonicity. We obtain an axiomatization of the superior rule by strength-
ening the inessential player property for union closed games to the stronger inessential
player property. This stronger property is not satisfied by the union rule. We obtain a
characterization of the union rule by adding independence of irrelevant coalitions. In
that case we can do without structural monotonicity.
As mentioned in Sect. 3, both the superior and the union rule can also be defined
and axiomatized without assuming in Definition 1 that the ‘grand coalition’ N is fea-
sible. By condition 2 in that definition, the players that do not belong to the largest
feasible subset of N do not belong to any feasible coalition. Referring to these players
as irrelevant players, we can define the superior rule and the union rule by applying
these two rules to the game and union closed system restricted to R() = {i ∈ N |
there is an S ∈  with i ∈ S}, and assigning zero payoff to all irrelevant players.
The two rules can be axiomatized for such situations by requiring the axioms for the
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relevant players, and by adding the irrelevant player property stating that irrelevant
players get zero payoff.
The axioms discussed in this paper all are applied to a fixed union closed system .
Myerson (1980) characterized the Myerson rule for conference structures using fair-
ness. A straightforward modification of the fairness axiom in Myerson (1977, 1980)
states that deleting a feasible coalition S ∈ , such that \{S} is still union closed,
changes the payoffs of players in S by the same amount. The superior rule does not
satisfy this fairness, but the union rule does. However, the union rule is not the only
solution for games on union closed systems that satisfies (component) efficiency, fair-
ness and the irrelevant player property.7 Axiomatizations using axioms that require
us to allow to change the set of feasible coalitions, such as fairness, will be studied in
future research.
Another point we like to mention is that the notion of conference structure does
not put any condition on the collection of feasible sets, i.e., a conference structure is
an arbitrary collection of subsets of N . However, by Myerson (1980)’s definition of
connectedness, every single player is connected and thus earns its own worth in the
restricted game. So, even if a singleton does not belong to the conference structure, a
single player earns its worth in the restricted game. This differs from our approach,
in which rv,({i}) = v({i}) if {i} ∈ , and rv,({i}) = 0 otherwise. Alternatively,
in line with Myerson (1980) we could always take rv,({i}) = v({i}) irrespective of
whether {i} is feasible or not. Because of Myerson’s definition of connectedness and
thus the restricted game, it does not matter whether a conference structure does or
does not contain {i} for any i ∈ N . Consequently, an arbitrary conference structure F
yields the same Myerson rule payoffs as the conference structure F ∪ {{i} | i ∈ N },
obtained from F by adding all singleton coalitions.8 This does not hold for the class
of union closed systems. When adding all singleton coalitions to a union closed sys-
tem , the resulting collection of coalitions  ∪ {{i} | i ∈ N } is not a union closed
system anymore, since by condition 2 of Definition 1, the unique union closed system
containing all singletons is the collection  = 2N .
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